Negative effects from groundwater mining are observed globally. They threaten future supply locally. Especially in semiarid to arid regions, where aquifers are the sole freshwater resource, this is problematic and can lead to an excessive rise of provision costs. Proper resource management in such environments is crucial. In many instances, however, aquifers are common property resources. In such cases and depending on resource characteristics and the nature of competing uses, their management is inherently multiobjective, and benefits from cooperative management are likely to be substantial. This paper presents a methodology for the determination of optimal, cooperative allocation policies in multiobjective aquifer management problems. Our model couples a finite difference aquifer model with an economic model that accounts for water provision costs. Discounted temporal installation and pumping and conveyance costs determine the vector-valued objective function. Each of the objectives characterizes the individual present costs over a given time horizon that the corresponding decision makers wish to minimize. Constraint handling is implemented by the option of moving wells. A multiobjective evolutionary algorithm is coupled to the management model so as to approximate cooperative tradeoff policies on the Pareto surface. These solutions can be ranked against existing, noncooperative status quo strategies. Consequently, the simulation-optimization model is applied to the northwest Sahara aquifer system which is used noncooperatively as a resource by Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. We find that significant capital gains can be achieved by the establishment of intelligent pump scheduling. Since each country could benefit, a strong incentive toward the implementation of such cooperative strategies exists.